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The plaintiff was in the employ of another who was engaged by the
oivner upon the work of filling up and grading a piece of land situated
on the side of defendant's railroad. The defendant had made an arrangemen with the owner of the land, by which the railroad company was to
furnish him the dirt, with which to fill his land to the grade of the tracks
and street. The dirt was loaded by the defendant's servants upon the
dump-cars, owned and managed by the defendant, and conveyed from a
point a short distance from the place to be graded. The business of
dumping and the men, who were to engage in it, were under the direction of a conductor of the dumping train, who had also the authority to,
hire men, when, as he thought, his crew was insufficient for the work.
This conductor requested the plaintiff employer's workmen, including
the plaintiff, to assist in dumping the cars, and after the first day they
did all the dumping. These facts were also known to the defendant's
chief engineer, who had the entire charge of the work and made daily
visits.
While so engaged the plaintiff attempted to dump a loaded car but
because of its condition, of which he was ignorant, it tipped and fell
upon him. This car had been disabled some hours before, and was improperly continued in the work, after having been set aside for repairs.
EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY FOR
OF ONE WHO

ASSISTS

HAVING

His

SERVANTS' NEGLIGENT INJURY

AN

INTEREST IN THE OPERATION,

IN IT.

In this case it was determined that "if one who has no
interest in the work to be performed, a mere bystander,
voluntarily assists the servants of another, either with or
without the latter's request, he must do so at his own
risk." And, also, "one who has an interest in the work
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to be performed, and for his own convenience, or to facilitate
or expedite his own work, assists the servants of another
at their request or with their consent, is not thereby
deprived of his right to be protected against the carelessness of the other's servants. In the former class of
cases the master will not be responsible. In the latter he will
be." Three of a court of eight justices dissented, and, as no
further opinion is given, their dissent must be taken to have
gone to the general proposition, or even a proposition less
broad, but sufficient for the decision of the case.
It is thought, first, that the above is stated too broadly for
the authorities cited, and, perhaps, exceeded the intention of
the court.
Second, even the proposition limited to the requirements of
the decision cannot be sustained on principle.
Third, while some of the authorities cited do support the
decision, they cannot be considered as well reasoned, as will
be shown; and one of the cases cited is really against it.
In the opinion of the court to which the Chief Justice and
two associates dissented, it is said: "It is insisted in the
defence that it was the'duty of the railroad company to dump
Jose's earth out of the cars, and that they had no authority to
employ Jose's men to assist them, and that Jose's men were
trespassers in attempting to do so, and that being trespassers
the railroad company owed them no duty, and was under no
.obligation to protect them against the carelessness of its servants." They followed the language first quoted, and instructions to the same effect were sustained.
As will be seen when the cases in its support are given, they
all relate to injuries by a consignee assisting the servants of a
consignor. In these cases the "interest in the work" is
really the ownership of the thing to be done; and the "work "
is the limit of the business of the consignor and the beginning of that of the consignee. The considerations which
would make the master liable for the negligence of a servant,
injuring one receiving his own property, might be very different from those where one interested merely in the general success of the operation, assists in the business purely
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that of the employer, by whose servants' negligence he is
injured. It was not the purpose of the court to determine
the extent of the rule but merely to distinguish the position of
one "having an interest in the performance of the work"
from a volunteer properly so call~d. But "where most of the
cases cited arose out of this relation, and the reason stated for
the proposition was only applicable to this relation, this should
be made clear in the statement of the proposition.
We have next to determine whether the more limited proposition applicable to the facts and reason of the case can be
supported on principle. This is whether an employer is to be
held liable to one who assists his servants in their work of
delivery, becaus6 of his interest as consignee or servant of
consignee, and is injured by the servant's negligence.
There is no more familiar and well settled rule than that of
the employers liability for his servant's negligent injury of
.strangers to the employment. At the same time the artificial
reasons given to support the rule must certainly 4iave lead to
confusion in practice. This error consists in attempting to
trace the connection between the injurious act of the servant
and some personal fault of the principal who is sought to be
made liable. Just as no man personally acts at his peril or is
liable for all the damage he may do, and on the other hand
-cannot limit his liability by a lawful intention, in that extension of his person and responsibility he is not liable for all
.acts of his agent or servant which are made possible by the
-employment, nor yet is his responsibility limited by his intention or reasonable expectation. The limitation of responsibility for personal acts and that in agency are to be determined
by public policy. And this is the method for securing in
largest measure the ends for which the law aims. Two at
least of these ends may be stated, that is, freedom of individual
action and also enterprise by means of agents and the so-called
personal rights. It is not meant that the exact position of
public policy can be stated or is to be discovered by any process in the particular case. All that is meant is that there is a
support to the rules which prevents us from referring it to a
single absolute principle which is either in itself necessary or
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deduced from any such primary principle. There is therefore
no a priorireason for the rule of the master's liability, but in
certain positions public policy has placed the application of the
rule beyond question. In most of the cases where the master
is made liable the person injured is in the exercise of an independent right, that is, receives no profit from its being conducted and takes no part in it. This was doubtless one of the
considerations which influenced the minds of the courts who
established the rule of coservice. It was not merely an interest
in the general success, but actual placing one's self in the
position of danger for the purpose of the business in whose
success the injured servant was interested: Baugh v. R. R.,
149 U. S. 368 ; Moynikan v. Hills Co., 146 Mass. 586 ; Hedley v. Steamship Co. [1894], App. Cases, 222; Wilson v.
Merry, I H. L. Se. 326; N. Y. Lake E. & W. R. R. Co. v.
Bell, 112 Pa. 400.
The master's exemption has been extended to the case,
where the gpneral servant of another is hired or loaned to.
him for a special work, and works with his servants. Here.
the ultimate purpose of the general servant is to facilitate his
first master's business, and his engaging in the business of the
second is only subsidiary to that end. But, in law, its ultimate
purpose is disregarded; coming into the position of a servant
and under its peculiar risks and not in the exercise- of independent rights, he is refused redress against the master for the
servant's negligence: Donovan v. Laing [1893], I Q. B. 629;
Johnson v. Lindsay [ 189 1], A. C. 371 ; Hasty v. Sears, 157
Mass. 123; Killen v. Faxcon, 125 Mass. 485. In this case
the question is whether the interest of the consignee in the
delivery should be held sufficient to confer upon him the
rights of a stranger on his own business, or place him in the
position of one without such interest, a pure volunteer, or that
of a special servant. It is to be admitted that the fact of interest seems to put the person in somewhat a better position
than a mere volunteer. Yet such a person is not exercising
an independent right, and is to be placed in no better position
than a special servant, unless it is held that every servant intrusted with delivery has the authority to permit the assist-
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ance of the consignees, and that, further, this would place the
consignee assisting in the position of a stranger. Delivery is
doubtless a matter of intention so far as passing title is concerned; but whether the manner of it will charge the consignor or consignee depends upon the one to whose servants
the direction of the delivery is made. Thus in Union Steamship
Co. v. Claridge [1894], App. Cases, 185, where a steamship
company retained control over its servants who assisted the
servants of the stevedores in discharging a ship of the defendants, they were held liable for the negligence of a watchman,
who injured one of the servants of the stevedores. It is
doubtless that the master should not be made liable to those
who force themselves into his business, to say that the servants
have authority to permit, is to beg the question.
It is impossible to derive any assistance in answering this
question from the rule of the carrier's liability for his servant's
negligent injury of trespassers. In some cases, he is said to
be liable for no negligence; in some cases, only where the
injury is wilful, while, in other cases, he is liable for negligence
somewhat greater than that necessary to make him liable for
an injury to a passenger. The rule, with regard to the negligent injury by servants of a carrier of passengers, has been
made peculiar by the public nature of the business and by the
quasi-surety position in regard to passengers. Much of the
language used in holding the carrier liable for the servant's
negligent or wilful injury of trespassers is applicable only to a
personal liability of those at fault.
We will now review a few of the authorities. The facts of
.Degg v. Midland Ry. Co., I H. & N. 773, is thus stated by
BRAMWELL, B.: "The defendants were possessed of a railway
and carriages and engines; their servants were at work on the
railway in their service with those carriages and engines; the
deceased voluntarily assisted some of them in their work;
others of the defendant's servants were negligent about their
work, and by reason thereof the deceased was killed; the
defendant's servants were persons competent to do the work;
the defendants did not authorize the negligence." It was held
that no action could be maintained because the deceased could

EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY FOR INJURY

place himself in any better position by his voluntary act than
if he had actually been a servant. The court also said:
The law for reasons of supposed convenience more than on
principle makes a master liable in certain cases for the acts of
his servants, not only in cases in the nature of contract, which
depend on different considerations, but in cases independent of
contract, such as negligent driving in the public streets, when
damage is thereby done. This is a responsibility the law has
put on them; there is a duty on them to take care that their
servants do no damage to others by negligence in their work
for their master, or compensate the sufferer where such dam:age is done. The public interest may require this for the
-public benefit; but why should a wrong doer have power to
.create such a responsibility and such a duty?
Four years afterwards the same rule was applied in Potter v.
Faulkner, I Bert & Smith, 8oo. In this case the plaintiff was
waiting with a "lorry" to receive a load of cotton for his master
from the defendant's warehouse, and at the request of the
defendant's carter, assisted in lowering a bale of cotton into the
lorry of another and was injured by the negligence of the
defendant's porters. The plaintiff was held to have put himself in the position of a fellow servant, and the master was not
held liable. In this case the ultimate purpose of the plaintiff
was to facilitate his master's business, yet this does not seem
to have received any attention.
In 1887 a somewhat similar case, O'Sullivan v. O'Connor,
occurred in Ireland, 22 T. R. I. 467. The plaintiff after purchasing some felt of the defendant with the permission of the
servant, went into the loft where it was stored, to inspect the
article purchased. The loft was open at one end and the
plaintiff was acquainted with its construction. While unrolling
the felt, and walking backwards, the plaintiff fell from the loft
and was injured. It was held that in assisting the servant he
Here his interest
was "a mere volunteer, a mere licensee."
in the purchase did not entitle him to assist the servant and
impose any greater liability on the employer with regard to his
.premises.
The recent case of Wischam v. Richards, 136 Pa. lO9
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[189o]. is against the decision in the principal case. The
defendant had contracted to deliver to one B. a large fly-wheel,
ten feet in diameter and weighing five thousand pounds. The
wheel was brought to B.'s place of business for delivery in two
sections, and was in charge of three of defendant's men.
B., the consignee, made some suggestions as to proper support
for the derrick and rigging which belonged to the defendant
and was in their charge. The consignor then left and was
absent thereafter. At the request of the defendant's man, the
foreman of B. called a workman in the employ of B. to assist
in the work of delivery. The plaintiff responded and by the
negligence of a servant of the defendant was injured. The
court said that the case was a close one, highly exceptional in
its facts, and apparently without precedent. The plaintiff was
held to be in the position of a fellow servant and therefore had
no right to recover. As to the suggestion that the plaintiff
.assisted only at the discretion of his superior, which determined
the mind of the lower court in removing him from the class of
volunteers, the court said: "As I regard the matter, the cases
teach us that it is not because the associated servant is a
volunteer, that he is denied redress for the negligence of
a fellow servant, but because it is the well established law of
the relation between the servants whom he joins, and their
master, that their is no such liability on the part of the
master. Hence by joining them in their common service, he
becomes, as to the master, one of them with the same rights
and duties as to the master, but with no higher rights as
against him. Certainly, without his consent he cannot reasonably be subjected to a greater obligation, by the act of one of
his servants in engaging the service of another, than he is
under to that servant." The court is not so sound in distinguishing the case at hand from that in which a consignee
assists the servants of the consignor in the delivery of his own
article. It is not clear why there should be any distinction;
the servant's business is certainly that of his master so far as
to entitle him to take part in the delivery.
The position of a mere volunteer is well settled: See also
Chm-ch v. Chicago, Of. & St. P. Ry. Co., 52 N. W. R. 647 ;
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Flver v. R. R. Co., 69 Pa. St. 2 10; Filcs v. B. & N. R. C6.,
31 N. E. 311; Sherman v. R. R. Co., 72 Mo. 62; Sparks v.
Ri'. Co., 82 Ga. 156. On the other hand, the position of the
court in distinguishing one who has an interest as consignee
in the performance of the work, assisting the servants of the
consignor, is sustained by some of the cases.
In Holmes v. N. E. Ry. Co., 4 L. R. Ex. 254 [1869], the
defendants had a siding at their station, on which cars were
shunted, and from which consignees received coal. Therewas but one porter at the station; and it was customary for
the consignees or their servants to assist in the operation of
unloading and, for the purpose, to pass along a flagged way.
The plaintiff, a consignee of coal, went to the station, and, not
being able to give it to him in the usual manner, he was permitted to take what he needed, and, while descending on the
flagged way, was injured. It was held that the habitual use
of this method of delivery imposed on the defendant the duty
to keep this way in condition, and that the plaintiff was not
a mere licensee. This case is to be distinguished, because the
mode was habitual, and the assisting was mere receiving. But
the case, which does support the principal case, is Wright v.
L.&N.W.R.R.,L.R.,IoQ. B. 2 9 8; I Q. B. D. 252. In
this case the plaintiff sent a heifer by defendants railway to
to their station. On arrival, there being only two porters
available for shunting the car containing the animal to the
siding from which alone the plaintiff could receive it, in order
to save delay the plaintiff assisted in shunting the car. While
so doing, he was injured by the negligent running of another
train on this siding by the defendant's servants. In this case
there was also a practice of allowing persons to assist in getting
their cattle cars shunted; and the station master was standing
by, and made no objection to the plaintiff's assisting. The plaintiff was allowed to recover. MELLISH, L. J., put his decision
on the ground that it was the plaintiff's property, the practice
at the station, and the assent of the station master. CLEASBY,
B., said, " according to an usual practice, he assisted in the
delivery of his own goods, on his own behalf not as a servant
of the company." If there had been no such general practice
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and the plaintiff had assisted at the invitation of those engaged in the work, the decision might have been different.
In Evarts v. St. Paul,M. & H. Ry. Co., 57 N. W. 459, the
rule of volunteers was limited. If,after discovering that the
volunteer has placed himself in a position of danger, the servants fail to use reasonable care to avert the damage, the
master will be liable. The court said: "We fail to see why a
volunteer should have any less rights than a mere trespasser.
Because a man is a trespasser or a volunteer, he is not, therefore, an outlaw, so as to permit others to wilfully or recklessly
do him an injury. It is no doubt the law, as repeatedly held,
that if a person volunteers to assist the servants of another,
the master as such owes him no duty; that he assumes all the
ordinary risks of the situation; that he cannot recover from
the master for an injury caused by a defect in the instrumentalities used, or by mere negligence of the servants." Such a
distinction makes the rule valueless and unmeaning. Neither
the trespasser nor the volunteer is an outlaw, and, if the
master or the servants with his authority injured such a one,
the master might well be made to answer. But the question
is whether this should be the case where the injury is beyond
the authority.
It certainly seems hard to hold that where a passenger on
a street railway car assists in backing, the car on the track,
and is carelessly run against and injured by other servants of
the railroad, he* should be without recovery. (In Street Ry.
Co. v. Boiton, 43 Ohio St. 224, such a person was allowed to
recover.) But this is only because the person was where he
had a right to be independently, and his assisting did not
bring him into any peculiar dangers: See also Eason v. Ry.
Co., 68 Texas, 577.
H. A. C.

